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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE CANADIAN AUTO WORKERS-MAGNA INTERNATIONAL,
INC. FRAMEWORK OF FAIRNESS AGREEMENT:
A U.S. PERSPECTIVE

MARTIN H. MALIN*
INTRODUCTION
On October 15, 2007, the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) and Magna
International, Inc. (Magna) entered into a historic agreement entitled,
“Framework of Fairness Agreement” (FFA).1 The FFA “went further than any
other Canadian neutrality agreement in terms of the organizing benefits it
conferred on the CAW,”2 creating what York University Professor David
Doorey has called “a remarkable scenario for CAW organizers, completely at
odds with the environment they would be used to operating under in almost
every other organizing campaign.”3 Nevertheless, the FFA has been extremely
controversial among unions and their supporters in Canada. Although
approved by the CAW Council on December 7, 2007,4 there was significant
dissent within the union’s ranks.5 The Ontario Federation of Labour, of which
* Professor and Director, Institute for Law and the Workplace, Chicago-Kent College of Law,
Illinois Institute of Technology. I wish to acknowledge excellent research assistance from Tracy
Scholnick Gruber, Chicago-Kent College of Law class of 2009, helpful comments from Susan A.
FitzGibbon, Cesar Rosado Marzán, and Richard Warner, and financial support from the MarshallEwell Research Fund at Chicago-Kent.
1. See generally Framework of Fairness Agreement Between: Magna International, Inc. and
National, Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers of Canada (CAW-Can.)
(Oct. 15, 2007), http://www.caw.ca/en/3642.htm (last visited Feb 15, 2010) [hereinafter FFA].
2. David J. Doorey, Six Questions About Neutrality Agreements (And Some Answers) 1
(Apr. 15, 2009) (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1380342.
3. Id.
4. See Press Release, Transportation and General Workers of Canada, CAW Council
Overwhelmingly Endorses Magna Framework of Fairness (Dec. 7, 2007), available at
http://www.caw.ca/en/3552.htm; Tony Van Alphen, CAW Membership Formally Approves ‘No
Strike’ Pact, THESTAR.COM, Dec. 8, 2007, http://www.thestar.com/Business/article/283706.
5. See, e.g., Van Alphen, supra note 4; Tony Van Alphen, Critics Fume over Magna Deal,
TORONTO STAR, Nov. 17, 2007 at B2; Tony Van Alphen, Key CAW Leader Opposes Magna
Deal, WHEELS.CA, Oct. 29, 2007, http://www.wheels.ca/printArticle/32508; Jeff Casey,
CAW/Magna Framework of Fairness Agreement, 14 RUBBER REPORT (CAW-TCA Canada
newsletter), Winter 2007, at 2, available at http://www.cawlocal.ca/4451/newsletters.asp#
(newsletter of CAW Local 4451 arguing against the FFA); The Magna Charter Dilemma,
NEWSLETTER (CAW TCA Local 2200), Nov. 27, 2007, at 23, available at http://www.caw
525
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the CAW is not a member, voted to condemn the FFA.6 Commentators
suggested that the FFA violated the Code of Ethical Practices in the Canadian
Labour Congress Constitution,7 and sacrificed “the very cornerstones upon
which the Canadian trade-union movement is built.”8
In this Article, I analyze the FFA from the perspective of United States
labor law and use the analysis as a vehicle for examining the ongoing
controversy in the United States concerning neutrality and voluntary
recognition agreements. In Part I, I review the FFA, its history and
background, and the controversy in Canada. In Part II, I discuss why the FFA
would be illegal in the United States. In Part III, I use that discussion as a
vehicle for examining the controversy over neutrality and card check
agreements in the United States and suggest guidelines for evaluating their
legality.
I. THE FRAMEWORK OF FAIRNESS AGREEMENT
A.

The Parties

Magna International began in 1957 as a small tool and die shop in
Toronto.9 It grew to be the largest employer in the Canadian automotive
industry with 18,000 hourly production employees at forty-five facilities.10
Worldwide, it operates 200 plants with 84,000 employees.11 It has ambitions to
become an auto assembler as well. When Daimler sought to divest itself of its
Chrysler operations, Magna was one of the unsuccessful bidders.12 When
General Motors sought to sell its Opel Division, Magna was one of the

2200.ca/Files/Newsletter/2007/Nov%2007%20Newsletter.pdf (reporting unanimous membership
vote to oppose FFA).
6. See Ian Urquhart, Labour Condemns CAW Deal, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 27, 2007,
http://www.thestar.com/news/article/280100.
7. Geoff Bickerton, Magna-CAW Framework of Fairness Agreement is an Affront to Union
Democracy, BULLET (E-Bulletin No. 67, The Socialist Project), Oct. 24, 2007,
http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/bullet067.html.
8. Editorial, The Magna Agreement: Not the Way Forward, CANADIAN DIMENSION,
Jan./Feb. 2008, at 4.
9. Wayne Lewchuk & Don Wells, Transforming Worker Representation: The Magna
Model in Canada and Mexico, LABOUR/LE TREVAIL, Fall 2007, at 108 [hereinafter Lewchuk &
Wells, Transforming Worker Representation].
10. CAW & Magna: A Window of Opportunity (December 2007) at 11, available at
www.caw.ca/en/3651.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2010) (on file with the Saint Louis University Law
Journal) (PowerPoint presentation on FFA by CAW leadership to the CAW Council) [hereinafter
CAW FFA PowerPoint].
11. Lewchuk & Wells, Transforming Worker Representation, supra note 9, at 109.
12. See National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of
Canada (CAW-Canada), CAW-Magna Timeline, http://www.caw.ca/en/3641.htm (last visited
Feb. 15, 2010).
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bidders.13 Magna’s growth may be attributed in part to the strategy of General
Motors, Ford, and Chrysler in the 1980s to reduce their labor costs by
outsourcing the fabrication of parts and other components.14 Its production
workers’ wage scale was about 40% below the wage scales of the Detroit
Three—allowing Magna to produce parts and components at a lower cost.15 It
spread its workforce among numerous small plants that it tended to locate on
the fringes of urban areas.16
Magna has drawn its workforce largely from people who previously
worked “at farms, restaurants, . . . convenience stores,” and similar employers
who paid much lower wages than Magna and offered even fewer benefits,
including a large number of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe and
Asia.17 Consequently, Magna’s workers have tended to compare their
compensation not to that paid at unionized automotive plants, but to what they
received in their former jobs.18 Magna has been able to pay skilled and
professional workers, such as engineers, lower wages than the automakers by
hiring immigrants who lack the American credentials likely to be found among
comparable employees at the Detroit Three, as well as by providing training
and promotion from within the organization.19 It also has relied, to a large
extent, on existing employees to refer new hires, particularly family
members.20
New hires enter as temporary employees and are paid less than permanent
employees.21 They have no set probationary period and become permanent
employees at management’s discretion.22 The temporary employees provide a
buffer that protects permanent employees against layoffs23 and provide another

13. See Joint Press Release, Magna International, Inc. and Savings Bank of the Russian
Federation, Magna and Sberbank Announce Revised Offer for Opel (July 21, 2009), available at
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9MTA2MDh8Q2hpbGRJRD0t
MXxUeXBlPTM=&t=1.
14. Lewchuk & Wells, Transforming Worker Representation, supra note 9, at 109.
15. Id. at 112. This comparison does not take into account the recent wage and benefit
concessions that the CAW and its United States counterpart, the International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) have agreed to
with General Motors and Chrysler.
16. Id. at 113.
17. Id. at 121; Wayne Lewchuk & Don Wells, When Corporations Substitute for Adversarial
Unions: Labour Markets and Human Resource Management at Magna, 61 RELATIONS
INDUSTRIELLES/INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 639, 655 (2006) [hereinafter Lewchuk & Wells, When
Corporations Substitute].
18. Lewchuk & Wells, When Corporations Substitute, supra note 17, at 651.
19. Id. at 655.
20. Id. at 654–55.
21. Id. at 651.
22. Id.
23. Lewchuk & Wells, Transforming Worker Representation, supra note 9, at 116.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

528

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:525

basis of comparison that reinforces permanent employee satisfaction with their
wages and benefits.24
Seniority plays a very minor role at Magna. Instead, management enjoys
much more discretion than in unionized facilities, and advancement is based on
performance and cooperative attitude.25 Workers rely on their relationships
with supervisors to pave the way for advancement or favorable treatment, such
as approval of vacation schedules and the hiring of family members and
friends.26 “To be successful, workers need to adhere to an unwritten code of
conduct regarding their work ethic and acceptance of corporate goals.”27
Annual wage increases are set unilaterally by management and tied closely
to firm profitability. Distribution of wage increases depends on employees’
evaluations. The evaluations center not only on performance criteria such as
productivity and attendance, but also on criteria tied to worker cooperation
with management. Employees who are judged substandard receive only half
of the wage increase until they improve and meet performance criteria.28
Magna also distributes 10% of its pre-tax profits to its employees. The
money is invested in Magna stock and held in trust in individual employee
accounts. Employees may not withdraw assets from their accounts for at least
ten years.29
Each of Magna’s small plants is semi-autonomous. A plant, or a small
network of plants, is responsible for bringing in enough contracts to justify
maintaining operations.30 At daily line meetings, weekly department meetings,
and monthly plant meetings, supervisors and managers report on worker
productivity and on how the plant is doing competitively.31 This results in a
“workplace and corporate-centered model of cohesion in which workers look
to management rather than to class-based organizations such as unions . . . to
provide a ‘haven in a heartless world.’”32
This approach appears to undermine worker solidarity. For example,
injured workers,
[r]ather than receiving the support of co-workers . . . are more likely to be
viewed as faking injuries and violating the implicit bargain of high effort
norms. . . . Co-workers, dependent on management honouring the implicit noncontractual labour bargain, fear associating too closely with workers who have

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See id. at 121.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 115; Lewchuk & Wells, When Corporations Substitute, supra note 17, at 646.
Lewchuk & Wells, Transforming Worker Representation, supra note 9, at 115.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 117–18.
Id. at 113.
Lewchuk & Wells, When Corporations Substitute, supra note 17, at 647.
Lewchuk & Wells, Transforming Worker Representation, supra note 9, at 113.
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fallen out of management favour and who have become a drag on overall
33
company success and profits.

Magna maintains a “Concerns Resolution Process,” which features an
“Open Door Policy,” under which employees are encouraged to view their
concerns as individual problems to be worked out informally with supervision,
rather than formally pursued collective grievances.34 If problems are not
resolved within forty-eight hours, however, a human resources manager
intervenes.35 Each plant employs an employee advocate (EA), an hourly
employee selected by management whose continued functioning in office is
subject to periodic ratification by majority vote of the EA’s peers.36 Despite
the name, the EA’s role is to guide employees in disputes but “not to
represent” them.37 A Fairness Committee (FC) consists of managers and
employee representatives elected by the workers.38 Employees may take
matters to the committee and committee members may accompany employees
to meetings with management, but, like the EA, they do not serve as
representatives.39 Workers may also appeal to the corporate level by using an
employee hotline.40 Most issues, however, are resolved with direct supervision
at the work group level.41
Magna’s methods of hiring and rewarding employees and resolving
employee grievances strongly encourage workers to internalize corporate
values and bond with management, while hampering class-based worker
solidarity. Organizing employees at Magna would present a challenge for any
union.
In 1936, the UAW organized its first Canadian local at the Kelsey Wheel
Windsor, Ontario auto parts plant.42 In 1985, all of the Canadian UAW locals
split off from their parent union and formed the CAW.43 For decades, first the
UAW, and then the CAW, attempted to organize workers at Magna with
extremely limited success. In the early part of the new century, the CAW
succeeded in organizing about 1000 Magna workers from three plants:

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 115.
Id. at 114; FFA, supra note 1, at 5.
Lewchuk & Wells, Transforming Worker Representation, supra note 9, at 114.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lewchuk & Wells, Transforming Worker Representation, supra note 9, at 114.
Id. at 114–15.
CAW-Magna Timeline, supra note 12.
Id.
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Integram Windsor, Mississauga Seating, and Innovatech Windsor. In doing so,
the CAW was assisted by pressure on Magna from the Detroit Three.44
B.

The Framework of Fairness Agreement (FFA)

Negotiations between the CAW and Magna that culminated in the FFA
began in 2005.45 The FFA declared the parties’ joint goals “of not only
preserving but expanding Canada’s automotive sector through highperformance work practices; investments in both capital and human resources;
effective and just labour relations; world-class quality, productivity, and
reliability; developing and renewing top-quality skilled trades; and continuing
to support and enhance social and environmental sustainability.”46
Under the FFA, Magna commits to investing in new products and
processes; operating efficiently; treating employees fairly; providing
employees with training; “maintaining health, safety and environmental
practices . . . ;” having employees share in the company’s financial successes;
communicating regularly to employees; and generating a competitive return for
shareholders.47 The CAW commits to serving as a check and balance for
employees within the Magna system; assisting Magna in sourcing; building
employee morale; enhancing employee cooperation and commitment;
facilitating relationships with customers; enhancing transparency and
credibility in existing Magna labour relations processes; providing professional
expertise, particularly with respect to health and safety, wellness, and
employee assistance programs; assisting with apprenticeship programs;
assisting in achieving racial and gender equality; obtaining better rates for
products and services; and partnering on legislative and community projects.48
The FFA contains a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) concerning the
union recognition process. Under the MOA, Magna provides the CAW with a
list of all employees in a prospective bargaining unit within one week of a
CAW request and updates the list monthly. The union gives the company
notice of its intent to conduct an election at a particular division. Once an
election date is scheduled, Magna allows CAW organizers to meet with
employees on Magna property during nonworking time in nonworking areas
for a period of seven days. Immediately prior to the election, Magna provides
the CAW access to the employees in a meeting called during work time. At
the meeting, Magna introduces the union, advises the employees that the two

44. CAW FFA PowerPoint, supra note 10, at 13; Tony Van Alphen, CAW Shelves Right to
Strike: Magna and Auto Workers Aim to Build a New Management-Union Relationship,
THESTAR.COM, Oct. 16, 2007, http://www.thestar.com/article/267140.
45. CAW FFA PowerPoint, supra note 10, at 13.
46. FFA, supra note 1, at 2.
47. Id. at 3.
48. Id. at 3–4.
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parties have a positive relationship and that they have a national collective
bargaining agreement, which commits both parties to the facility’s success and
growth. Both parties affirm their support for the FFA and the national
collective bargaining agreement.49
Immediately following the meeting, a mutually agreed upon “election
neutral” conducts a secret ballot election which simultaneously asks for
acceptance of the CAW as exclusive bargaining representative and ratification
of the national collective bargaining agreement. The national collective
bargaining agreement is deemed ratified, and the CAW is recognized as the
exclusive bargaining representative if a majority of employees who vote
approve the agreement.50
As indicated above, under the FFA, the CAW commits to serving as a
check and balance for employees within the Magna system.51 Consequently,
the FFA does not provide for a typical system of shop stewards and local
officers. Instead, it integrates the CAW into the existing Magna human
resources system.52
The FFA continues the Magna system of Fairness Committees (FC). An
FC is established for each division with members elected from each
department or work area and shift. The FFA declares the FC’s purpose as “a
resource in the Concern Resolution Process in each facility and to work to
build a positive and productive work environment within their Division.”53
The FFA adds that FC members “are not union representatives nor does their
role include the representation of employees.”54 A majority of FC members are
elected by the bargaining unit, with the remainder appointed by management.55
A secret ballot vote of the employees selects bargaining unit FC
members.56 To be eligible to serve, an employee must not be on probation,
must have a “[g]ood disciplinary record,” “must be able to communicate
effectively,” and must “[commit] to the principles of the Magna Employees’
Charter, the FFA and the National [Collective Bargaining] Agreement.”57 FC
members serve staggered three-year terms.58
The FFA does not provide for traditional shop stewards. Instead, it
continues the Magna position of Employee Advocate. The EA’s duties include
providing “support” to employees in the lower stages of the Concern

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 21–22.
Id.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
FFA, supra note 1, at 5.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 10, 16.
Id. at 16.
FFA, supra note 1, at 16.
Id.
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Resolution Process up through appeals to Magna’s hotline. Appeals beyond
the hotline are subject to the EA’s control, and the EA, rather than the
employee, pursues the matter on behalf of the employee.59 This appears to be
a significant modification of the Magna policy in its non-union facilities,
where the EA is not regarded as representing the employees.60
EAs must have at least three years’ seniority.61 Applicants for EA
positions are evaluated by the facilities’ Fairness Committees, which rank the
top three applicants.62 The CAW Assistant to the President (CAW AP) selects
one of the top three candidates to be the EA.63 Once selected, EAs remain in
office until removed by a vote of a majority of bargaining unit employees.64
The initial vote is held eighteen months following the EA’s selection with
subsequent votes held every thirty-six months.65
The FFA establishes an Employee Relations Review Committee (ERRC).
The ERRC consists of the CAW AP, the CAW National Representative
assigned to the Magna local, the Magna local President, and two representative
of Magna’s Executive Vice President for Global Human Resources “and one
Senior Operating Executive.”66 In addition to holding quarterly meetings that
in other contexts would be thought of as labor-management committee
meetings,67 the ERRC serves as the lead committee negotiating the national
collective bargaining agreement,68 and as the final internal step in the Concerns
Resolution Process.69
Under the FFA, all bargaining units at all Magna FFA facilities constitute a
single amalgamated CAW local.70 The EAs form the executive committee of
the amalgamated local and elect members of the committee to serve as the
local’s officers.71
Unlike the overwhelming majority of collective bargaining agreements,
which have formal grievance procedures in which employees or the union
pursue grievances that require responses by management followed by appeals
to, and responses from, successively higher management officials—the FFA
retains, with some modifications, Magna’s existing Concern Resolution

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

FFA, supra note 1, at 5–6.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
FFA, supra note 1, at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FFA, supra note 1, at 6.
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 6.
FFA, supra note 1, at 6.
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Process. Indeed, the term “grievance” does not appear in the FFA. This
appears to be in keeping with Magna’s human resources policy that regards
“grievances” as individual problems to be resolved at the most local level
possible.72
The FFA encourages employees to raise concerns or complaints with their
immediate supervisors but provides that they may use Magna’s Open Door
Process to raise the matter with the supervisor, an FC member, the department
manager, the human resources department, the assistant general manager, the
general manager, or the Joint Health and Safety Committee.73 Issues not
resolved through the informal process may be referred to the FC, which has
authority to apply the national collective bargaining agreement, except for
termination cases or pay and benefit rates matters.74
Employees may appeal to the Magna Hotline for corporate level review of
the FC decision, or they may bypass the local level entirely and begin their
complaint at the hotline level.75 All termination cases must originate at the
hotline level.76 Appeals beyond the hotline level are controlled by the EA.77
The next level of appeal is the Concern Resolution Subcommittee of the ERRC
(CRSC).78 The CRSC consists of the EA and a representative from the CAW
AP, the Group Human Resources Director, and the facility General Manager or
his or her designee.79 The CRSC meets monthly and is to decide appeals
within forty-eight hours of the meeting.80 If it is unable to resolve a case, the
CAW AP or the Division General Manager may appeal the matter within ten
days to the ERRC.81 If the employee or division management is not satisfied
with the ERRC’s resolution, either the CAW AP or the Magna Executive Vice
President may appeal the matter to a neutral arbitrator.82
Negotiations for a new national agreement commence within fifteen days
of a notice by either party of its desire to bargain.83 The notice must be served
within ninety days of the existing agreement’s expiration date.84 If agreement
cannot be reached or a tentative agreement does not win ratification from the
executive council of the amalgamated local or the members of the local, the

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
FFA, supra note 1, at 9–10.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 10.
Id.
FFA, supra note 1, at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
FFA, supra note 1, at 24.
Id. at 19.
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dispute is referred to arbitration.85 The FFA does not allow for a resort to
economic weapons such as strikes or lockouts.86 The FFA expressly provides
that the national agreement will reflect, among other things, that each division
is a separate profit center with its future dependent on maintaining “an
acceptable return on investment.”87 Thus, the FFA leaves intact a key Magna
practice that has led employees to identify with their local facility and its
management rather than build class-based solidarity with coworkers company
wide.
C. The Controversy in Canada
The FFA ignited a fierce debate within the labor movement in Canada.
The primary rationale advanced by the CAW for the FFA was the need to
arrest the spiraling decline in union density in Canada—in the private sector
generally and in the automotive industry in particular. The CAW observed that
union density in the Canadian private sector fell from over 30% in the 1970s to
17% in 2006.88 Noting the steeper decline in the United States, the CAW
cautioned, “We’re at a turning point now in Canada. We can follow the U.S.
path. It will take us a little longer. But we are clearly heading the same way.
Or we can turn it around. That’s our choice.”89
Turning to the automotive industry, the CAW noted that union density
among auto assemblers in Canada was 100% until the late 1980s, but had since
declined to approximately 70%.90 Nevertheless, the union asserted that it was
still able to control wages and working conditions across that sector.91 But in
the auto parts sector, the CAW maintained, its density was declining more
steeply and approaching 25%.92 Again drawing on the experience in the
United States, the CAW warned that if the trend was not reversed, its ability to
maintain wages and working conditions even at unionized facilities would be
threatened.93 With Magna representing 25% of the auto parts sector in Canada,
the CAW urged organizing its workforce under the FFA would bring union
density back to a level that would restore CAW control over labor standards
industry wide.94

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 24.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 8.
CAW FFA PowerPoint, supra note 10, at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id.
CAW FFA PowerPoint, supra note 10, at 7.
Id. at 11.
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Critics charge that the FFA represents:
a radical break from many of the union’s basic principles: it gave up the right
to strike; it proposed a model of organizing new members that essentially
relied on the good will of the employer, rather than the power and potential of
the union; it argued for a structure of workplace union representation that was
not independent of management, giving up the right to an independent, elected,
95
shop-floor set of union representatives . . . .

The University of Toronto’s Center for Industrial Relations and Human
Resources devoted its 2008 annual Sefton Lecture to a debate on the FFA by
McMaster University Labour Studies Professor Charlotte A. B. Yates and
CAW Economist Jim Stanford.96 Yates criticized the FFA for permanently
giving up the right to strike.97 She offered two grounds for her criticism. First,
she argued, that the right to strike is a human right rather than a commodity
and, therefore, is not to be traded off permanently.98 Second, while agreeing
that the number of strikes had decreased greatly, she nevertheless maintained
that, in appropriate circumstances, the strike or the threat of strike could still be
a powerful motivator for employer concessions.99
Yates maintained that continued divisions within the labor movement in
Canada pose an impediment to reversing the decline in union density.100 She
characterized the FFA as “driv[ing] a further wedge” in the movement.101
Yates criticized the FFA’s provisions for selecting union representatives
because they give central union administration, and potentially management,
influence over the process.102 She argued that this approach weakens
representatives’ networks and independence.103 She criticized the CAW for
building on Magna’s existing non-union system.104

95. Posting of Herman Rosenfeld to Doorey’s Workplace Law Blogs, http://www.yorku.ca/
ddoorey/lawblog/?p=730 (Feb. 4, 2009) (comments of retired CAW National Representative
Herman Rosenfeld).
96. Charlotte A.B. Yates & Jim Stanford, University of Toronto Sefton Memorial Lecture,
New Union Strategies for Tough Times: The CAW-Magna Deal, and other Responses (Mar. 27,
2008) (transcript available at http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/cir/library/seftonlectures/sefton
lectures.html); McMaster University Faculty Profile—Charlotte Yates, http://www.socsci.
mcmaster.ca/polisci/Webpages/Staff/charoletteyates.html.
97. Charlotte A.B. Yates, University of Toronto Sefton Memorial Lecture, New Union
Strategies for Tough Times: The CAW-Magna Deal, and other Responses (Mar. 27, 2008),
available at http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/cir/library/seftonlectures/seftonlectures.html.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Yates & Stanford, supra note 96.
101. Id.
102. Yates, supra note 97.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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Yates also expressed concern over the FFA’s language. She criticized the
use of “corporate competitiveness.”105 She also highlighted the FFA’s
references to “‘concerns’” and “‘employees’” rather than grievances and
workers.106 She urged, “[L]anguage is so very important as it reflects what and
who we are, but also shapes the terms and conditions under which we relate to
and include others in our lives.”107
Stanford defended the FFA. He positioned the FFA as a strategy to deal
with decreasing union density, which he characterized as “a threat to the
survival of our movement and a threat to the fundamental nature of Canadian
society.”108 He maintained that the CAW negotiated the FFA from a position
of strength derived from its successful organization at the three Magna plants,
and that the CAW extracted many concessions from Magna in the
negotiations.109 He characterized the FFA as a “significant step forward,”
observing that it gave Magna workers a full-time union representative, a threeyear cycle for negotiating new contracts, full arbitration if negotiations do not
produce agreement, ratification by secret ballot, and national representation
from the union.110
Stanford characterized the selection of the EA as “indirect,” but maintained
that such an approach was not unprecedented.111 He asserted with respect to
the EA, “At the end of the day, the rep will be a union activist with a mandate
from his constituency.”112
Stanford defended the FFA’s substitution of arbitration for the right to
strike over impasses in contract negotiations. He relied on data from the
Ontario Labour Relations Board which showed that there had been 125
voluntary agreements to substitute arbitration of contract terms for the right to
strike in Ontario in the prior ten years and concluded that in this regard the
FFA was “nothing new.”113 He maintained that arbitration could produce
results superior to the right to strike, contrasting the contract negotiated under
the FFA at Magna’s Windsor Modules plant with the contract negotiated with
a strike at a nearby TRW plant.114

105. Yates & Stanford, supra note 96.
106. Id.
107. Yates, supra note 97.
108. Jim Stanford, Opening Statement at the University of Toronto Sefton Memorial Lecture,
New Union Strategies for Tough Times: The CAW-Magna Deal, and other Responses 6 (Mar. 27,
2008), available at http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/cir/library/seftonlectures/SeftonLecture26th_
2008_Stanford_openingstatement.pdf.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Stanford, supra note 108.
114. Id.
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In contrast to Yates and others who criticized the FFA for undermining
class-based solidarity, Stanford positioned the FFA as a necessary response to
current market conditions where globalization leaves “less competitive space
for individual companies or even groups of companies to pay higher wages to
people and stay in business.”115 The challenge for unions, he maintained, is to
organize workers while ensuring that their employers remain in business.116 If
unions do not meet that challenge, workers will fear that unionization will lead
to job loss and will not join.117 To meet that challenge, the FFA represents “a
corporatist type of strategy by unions where when they do get in, they are
going to do what they can to improve the conditions of their workers, but
they’re also going to be looking at ways such as productivity growth, industrial
policy measures and other factors to try and keep their employers in
business.”118
Perhaps because the CAW’s attention and resources have been diverted by
the global economic meltdown, particularly the bankruptcies of Chrysler and
General Motors, the first year and a half of the FFA has not produced much
progress toward the CAW’s goal of organizing all Magna workers and
restoring union density in the Canadian auto parts sector toward 50%.119 In
November 2007, workers at Magna’s Windsor Modules plant voted for
recognition under the FFA.120 The action generated considerable controversy
as critics charged that the plant had already been or was on its way to being
organized traditionally and did not have to give up the right to strike to gain
recognition.121 In April 2008, workers at Magna’s Qualtech Seating Plant in
London, Ontario, voted for CAW recognition under the FFA.122 In January
2009, in an action that stirred almost as much controversy as the original FFA,
workers at the Mississauga Seating Plant, one of the three plants that the CAW
had organized prior to the FFA, voted, over the objection of their local
president, to ratify the FFA.123

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Stanford, supra note 108.
119. See CAW FFA Powerpoint, supra note 10, at 11 (detailing CAW goal to organize
Magna which employs about 25% of all auto parts workers in Canada and raise union density in
the auto parts sector back to around 50%).
120. See Van Alphen, Critics Fume over Magna Deal, supra note 5.
121. Id.
122. See Tony Van Alphen, Magna Workers Join CAW, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 11, 2008, at
B04.
123. See Tony Van Alphen, Magna Deal Spurs CAW Infighting, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 31,
2009, at B03.
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Perhaps because of the limited activity thus far under the FFA, there is no
reported litigation challenging its legality.124 Professor Doorey has catalogued
the issues the FFA raises under Canadian labor law, particularly the Ontario
Labour Relations Act.125 The next section considers how the FFA would fare
under United States law.
II. MAY UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS ADOPT THE FFA IN THE UNITED STATES?
If the CAW is correct and Magna provides a method whereby Canadian
labor can avoid following the path of organized labor in the United States,
American unions may look to it as a model to reverse their decline. Would
such a model be lawful in the United States? Two provisions of United States’
labor law would be implicated by an American version of the FFA: Title IV of
the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA)126 and section
8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).127 Together these
statutes envision employees who freely choose to be represented by labor
organizations that are independent of their employers and that they control
through democratic processes.
A.

Title IV of the LMRDA

Enacted in 1959, the LMRDA was a reaction to revelations resulting from
270 days of public hearings spread over two years conducted by the Senate
Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor and Management Fields,
better known as the McClellan Committee, for its Chair, Senator John
McClellan, Democratic senator from Arkansas.128 The Committee uncovered
corruption and mob domination of labor unions and linked such malfeasance to
antidemocratic practices it found in the same unions.129 It opined that
revitalizing union democracy would “substantially improve[]” the conduct of
union officials.130

124. Doorey, supra note 2.
125. Id.
126. 29 U.S.C. §§ 481–83 (2006).
127. Id. §§151–69. Section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act prohibits an
employer from giving to a labor organization “any money or other thing of value.” Id. §186(a).
The FFA gives the CAW access rights and assistance in organizing the Magna workforce which
can be enormously valuable. FFA, supra note 1, at 21. In Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, however,
the court held that the term “thing of value” refers to things that have quantifiable monetary value
and does not encompass an employer’s agreement to give a union access to its employees or to
remain neutral in the union’s organizing drive. 550 F.3d 369, 374–76 (4th Cir. 2008).
128. For background on the LMRDA, see MARTIN H. MALIN, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WITHIN
THE UNION 34–48 (BNA 1988).
129. See id. at 43.
130. S. Rep. No. 1417, at 452 (1958).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2010] THE CANADIAN AUTO WORKERS-MAGNA INTERNATIONAL, INC. FRAMEWORK

539

Congress’ rationale for requiring democratic elections went beyond
establishing a safeguard against corruption. Congress regarded workers’
democratic participation in the selection of those individuals empowered to
represent them as a fundamental right of American union members.131 The
House and Senate Committees expressed this sentiment almost identically:
It needs no argument to demonstrate the importance of free and democratic
union elections. Under the National Labor Relations and Railway Labor Acts
the union which is the bargaining representative has power, in conjunction
with the employer, to fix a man’s wages, hours, and conditions of employment.
The individual employee may not lawfully negotiate with his employer. He is
bound by the union contract. In practice, the union also has a significant role
in enforcing the grievance procedure where a man’s contract rights are
enforced. The Government which gives unions this power has an obligation to
insure that the officials who wield it are responsive to the desires of the men
and women whom they represent. . . . [T]he best assurance which can be given
132
is a legal guaranty of free and periodic elections.

Section 401(b) of the LMRDA requires every local labor organization to
elect its officers at least once every three years by secret ballot of its
membership.133 The statute requires international labor organizations to elect
their officers at least once every five years and intermediate bodies to do so at
least once every four years, but gives these bodies the option of election by
secret ballot or by delegates elected by secret ballot.134
The statute mandates that in every election required to be held by secret
ballot, every member in good standing be eligible to be a candidate “subject
to . . . reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed.”135 In Wirtz v. Hotel,
Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6,136 the Supreme Court held violative
of section 401(c) a union requirement that candidates for major offices have
had previous experience on the union’s executive board or assembly or its
predecessor body.137 Based on the explicit detailed provisions in Title IV
regulating union elections, the Court opined, “Congress plainly did not intend
that the authorization in § 401(e) of ‘reasonable qualifications uniformly
imposed’ should be given a broad reach. . . . The check of democratic elections
as a preventive measure is seriously impaired by candidacy qualifications

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

S. Rep. No. 187, at 20 (1959); H.R. Rep. No. 741, at 15–16 (1959).
S. Rep. No. 187, at 20; see also H.R. Rep. No. 741, at 15–16.
29 U.S.C. § 481(b) (2006).
Id. § 481(a), (d).
Id. § 481(e). This provision clearly applies to local unions. See LABOR UNION LAW AND
REGULATION 233 (William W. Osborne, Jr. et al. eds. 2003). It is an open question whether it
applies to internationals and intermediate bodies who elect their officers by conventions of
delegates rather than secret ballot.
136. 391 U.S. 492 (1968).
137. Id. at 493–95.
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which substantially deplete the ranks of those who might run in opposition to
incumbents.”138
The Court observed that the requirement led to only 1725 of the union’s
27,000 members being eligible to run for major offices.139 It concluded that,
“[p]lainly, given the objective of Title IV, a candidacy limitation which renders
93% of union members ineligible for office can hardly be a ‘reasonable
qualification.’”140 The Court rejected the union’s justification that, in light of
the size of the union and its treasury, the requirement reasonably assured that
principal officers would have prior experience with the local’s affairs.141 The
Court reasoned that Congress modeled the requirements for union elections on
political elections and that in both types of elections the voters are presumed
capable of evaluating candidate qualifications, including prior experience.142
In Local 3489, United Steelworkers of America v. Usery,143 the Court
invalidated a requirement that candidates for local union office have attended
at least half of the union’s meetings within the three years prior to the
election.144 The Court found the case controlled by its decision in Hotel
Employees Local 6 because the record demonstrated that the rule disqualified
96.5% of the membership.145 The Court rejected the local’s attempts to
distinguish Hotel Employees Local 6.146 The local argued that, unlike the
requirement in Local 6, its meeting attendance requirement could be met by
any member and the requirement did not have an effect of entrenching
incumbent union officers.147 The Court dismissed the argument that any
member could qualify by attending the meetings, observing that to attend a
sufficient number of meetings, a member would have to decide to qualify at
least 18 months prior to the election, a time when it was unlikely that there
would be much interest in running for office.148 The Court deemed irrelevant
the lack of any pattern of entrenched incumbent officers, stating, “Procedures
that unduly restrict free choice among candidates are forbidden without regard
to their success or failure in maintaining corrupt leadership.”149
From these two cases, it appears that in evaluating the reasonableness of a
qualification for office, the Court will balance the union’s institutional interests

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 499.
Id. at 501.
Id. at 502.
Hotel Employees Local 6, 391 U.S. at 503–04.
Id. at 504.
429 U.S. 305 (1977).
Id. at 310.
Id.
Id. at 310–11.
Id.
Local 3489, 429 U.S. at 310–11.
Id. at 312.
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served by the rule against the rule’s antidemocratic effects. In both cases, the
rule in question was not shown to serve any legitimate union interest, but
precluded over 90% of the members from candidacy. Moreover, the
antidemocratic effects were inherent in the operation of the rules. The prior
office-holding requirement made it impossible for most members to qualify,
while the attendance requirement forced the candidates to decide to run at a
time when interest in candidacy was likely to be low. The cases also suggest
that a rule that entrenches incumbent officers is not likely to survive judicial
scrutiny, but the absence of a history of such entrenchment will not save an
otherwise unreasonable requirement.150
Consideration of whether unions in the United States who adopt FFA-like
agreements will run afoul of the LMRDA focuses attention on the FFA’s
provisions concerning the employee advocate. EAs are not elected by direct
secret ballot of the membership.151 Applicants are screened by the Fairness
Committee, which ranks the top three and submits them to the Assistant to the
CAW President who makes the appointment.152
As previously noted, the EAs’ duties include providing “support” to
employees in the lower stages of the Concern Resolution Process, up through
appeals to Magna’s hotline. Appeals beyond the hotline are subject to the
EA’s control, and the EA, rather than the employees, pursues the matter on
behalf of the employees.153 In performing these duties, the EA would appear
to be comparable to a traditional union steward or business agent.
Title IV of the LMRDA only requires the election of “officers.” Section
3(n) defines “officer” as “any constitutional officer, any person authorized to
perform the functions of president, vice president, secretary, treasurer, or other
executive functions of a labor organization, and any member of its executive
board or similar governing body.”154 The definition is a broad one that
combines “title, function and position.”155 However, business agents, shop
stewards, and professional staff are considered as performing ministerial duties
or duties that implement rather than make policy decisions, and therefore, these
personnel are not considered officers.156
The EAs, however, do more than act as a steward or business agent. They
also comprise the executive committee of the amalgamated Magna local, and
they elect the local’s officers from among their ranks.157 Consequently, the

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

MALIN, supra, note 128, at 213–14.
FFA, supra note 1, at 18.
Id. at 10, 18.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
29 U.S.C. § 402(n) (2006).
See LABOR UNION LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 135, at 231.
29 C.F.R. § 452.19 (2009).
FFA, supra note 1, at 6.
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EAs are clearly officers under the LMRDA and, therefore, the failure of the
local membership to elect them by direct secret ballot would appear to run
afoul of Title IV.
EAs must have three years’ seniority with Magna.158 An important fact in
determining whether this would be considered a reasonable requirement for a
union officer under Title IV is the percentage of members that this requirement
disqualifies. Although we do not have that information, there is some
indication that the three-year seniority requirement would be problematic.
Department of Labor regulations provide that a rule requiring candidates for
office to have been employed at the trade for a reasonable period of time is
generally reasonable.159 The regulations do not further define a “reasonable
period.”160 There is some indication, however, that three years may be too
long. Although there is some older authority to the contrary, courts and the
Department of Labor seem to regard a requirement of continuous good
standing in the union of more than two years to be unreasonable.161 In any
event, it appears clear that the Canadian critics of the FFA’s dilution of rankand-file control over their representatives would find vindication in the United
States under the LMRDA.
B.

Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA

Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA makes it illegal for an employer “to dominate
or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or
contribute financial or other support to it.”162 Two key purposes have been
ascribed to section 8(a)(2): (1) to assure employee freedom of choice and (2) to
assure that an organization representing employees is independent of their
employer. The following subsections explore these purposes and then apply
section 8(a)(2), in light of these purposes, to the FFA.
1.

Employee Free Choice

There is general agreement that a purpose of section 8(a)(2) is to assure
employee free choice. Employee selection of an exclusive bargaining
representative should be free of undue employer or union interference or
coercion. Preservation of employee free choice was a driving force behind the
Supreme Court’s decision in International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v.
NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp.).163 The union in that case began an

158. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
159. 29 C.F.R. § 452.41(a) (2009).
160. See id. § 452.36 (“The question of whether a qualification is reasonable is a matter which
is not susceptible of precise definition, and will ordinarily turn on the facts in each case.”).
161. See LABOR UNION LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 135, at 235.
162. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2006).
163. 366 U.S. 731, 737 (1961).
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organizing campaign among the employer’s production and shipping
employees.164 During the campaign, some employees went on strike and some
of the strikers signed cards authorizing the union to act as their exclusive
bargaining representative.165 The union and employer engaged in negotiations
with respect to some of the issues involved in the strike.166 On August 30,
1957, based on a representation from the union that it had secured
authorization cards from a majority of employees, the parties signed a
“memorandum of understanding” which provided for employer recognition of
the union as exclusive bargaining representative, an end to the strike, and
improvements in wages and working conditions.167 Neither party verified the
union’s claim of majority status, and it later turned out that the claim was
erroneous.168 On October 10, 1957, the parties signed a formal collective
bargaining agreement.169 As of that date, the union did represent a majority of
the employees.170
The Supreme Court held that the grant of exclusive recognition to a union
at a time when it did not have the support of a majority of the employees
violated the NLRA, even though the parties in good faith believed that, at the
time of recognition, the union enjoyed majority support.171 It premised its
holding on the need to protect employee freedom of choice:
Bernhard-Altmann granted exclusive bargaining status to an agency selected
by a minority of its employees, thereby impressing that agent upon the
nonconsenting majority. There could be no clearer abridgment of § 7 of the
Act, assuring employees the right ‘to bargain collectively through
172
representatives of their own choosing’ or ‘to refrain from’ such activity.

The Court found it irrelevant that the union had obtained majority support by
the time the parties signed the formal collective bargaining agreement. It
accepted the lower court’s characterization of the situation as “a fait accompli
depriving the majority of the employees of their guaranteed right to choose
their own representative.”173
A corollary to the prohibition on recognition of a union lacking in majority
support is the Board’s long-standing rule that an employer may not recognize a
union until it has hired a representative complement of its workforce.174 In
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
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Majestic Weaving Co.,175 the employer entered into negotiations with the union
at a time when it had yet to hire a representative complement, with the
understanding that any resulting contract would depend on the union attaining
majority support at the appropriate time.176 Twenty-five years earlier, in Julius
Resnick, Inc.,177 the Board had approved such conditional recognition. In
Majestic Weaving, however, the Board considered Julius Resnick inconsistent
with the Court’s decision in Bernhard-Altman and overruled it.178 On the other
hand, for decades the Board has approved and enforced provisions in collective
bargaining agreements whereby the employer agrees both to recognize the
union at subsequently acquired facilities and to extend the contract’s
provisions to employees at such facilities upon the union’s presentation of
authorization cards evidencing its selection by a majority of the employees as
their exclusive bargaining representative.179 Although most employers actively
oppose unionization, there is no legal requirement for this opposition. Nor is
there a legal requirement that they prohibit union organizers from their
property. Indeed, cooperation during the organizing drive may legitimately
prove to be beneficial for both parties. Yet, employer conduct favoring a union
may interfere with employee free choice with respect to whether they will
choose to be represented by the favored union, by another union or by no
union. Issues concerning employer “cooperation” with a union seeking to
organize its workforce are resolved on a case-by-case basis. The Seventh
Circuit has catalogued the factors:
In determining whether management-labor cooperation has crossed over from
permissible co-operation to unlawful coercion, courts consider a confluence of
factors, with no one factor being dispositive. This non-exclusive list of factors
includes whether the employer solicited contact with the union; the rank and
position of the company’s solicitor; whether the employer silently acquiesced
in the union’s drive for membership; whether the employer shepherded its
employees to meetings with a prospective union; whether management was
present at meetings between its employees and a prospective union; whether
the signing of union authorization cards was coerced; and whether the

175. 147 N.L.R.B. 859 (1964), enforcement denied, 355 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1966). The Second
Circuit denied enforcement of the Board’s order on procedural grounds, opining that the Board’s
use of adjudication, rather than rulemaking, to “brand[] as ‘unfair’ conduct stamped ‘fair’ at the
time a party acted” was improper. Majestic Weaving, 355 F.2d at 860 (2d Cir. 1966). The
court’s view concerning the need to employ rulemaking was subsequently undermined by the
Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 290 (1974).
176. Majestic Weaving, 147 N.L.R.B. at 860.
177. 86 N.L.R.B. 38 (1949).
178. Majestic Weaving, 147 N.L.R.B at 860 n. 3
179. See, e.g., Houston Div. of the Kroger Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 388, 388–89 (1975). In Shaw’s
Supermarkets, the Board indicated its intention to revisit the acquired facilities cases. 343
N.L.R.B. 963, 963 (2004). The intervening election of President Obama and his appointment of
new members to the NLRB, however, makes it unlikely that the doctrine will now be revisited.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2010] THE CANADIAN AUTO WORKERS-MAGNA INTERNATIONAL, INC. FRAMEWORK

545

employer quickly recognized the assisted union after the employees signed
authorization cards yet exhibited prejudice against another union selected by
180
the employees.

Discriminatory treatment favoring an employer’s preferred union, coupled
with discharging employees for supporting the disfavored union or for refusing
to sign cards for the favored union, clearly violates section 8(a)(2) of the
Act.181 So too does a supervisor’s direction to employees to sign cards for the
favored union182 and granting access to the favored union while denying access
to its rival.183 Not all section 8(a)(2) violations are so blatant. Violations have
been found where a manager, after introducing a union representative,
remained in the room while the employees signed, or chose not to sign,
authorization cards;184 and where a manager introduced an employee he had
reason to know supported a rival union to an organizer from the favored union
and indicated the employer’s preference for the favored union.185
Even a disclaimer that the choice of representative is up to the employee
may be insufficient to avoid a section 8(a)(2) violation. In NLRB v. Keller
Ladders Southern, Inc.,186 a manager solicited two employees to assist a union
organizer in collecting authorization cards.187 The selected employees and
organizer, with the manager’s permission, called a meeting of employees
during a coffee break.188 The manager introduced the organizer, stated that he
knew a union would eventually want to organize the employees and that he
would not resist unionization, but the employees could do whatever they
wanted.189 He then left the room.190 The court, relying on the employer’s
designation of two employees to solicit their coworkers to sign cards without
the coworkers’ knowledge of the designation, found a section 8(a)(2)
violation.191
On the other hand, the Board has approved employer conduct which
generally may be thought of as assisting a union in an organizing drive. A
180. NLRB v. Midwestern Personnel Servs., Inc., 322 F.3d 969, 977–78 (7th Cir. 2003).
181. See NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 584, 597–98 (1941); see also Midwestern
Mining & Reclamation, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. 221, 255 (1985) (holding that favorable conduct
toward the employer’s preferred union coupled with unlawful conduct toward the disfavored
union violated § 8(a)(2)).
182. See Dairyland USA Corp., 347 N.L.R.B. 310, 310 (2006).
183. See NLRB v. Vernitron Elec. Components, Inc., 548 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1977); Duane
Reade, Inc., 338 N.L.R.B. 943, 944 (2003).
184. See North Hills Office Servs., 342 N.L.R.B. 437, 445 (2004).
185. See Windsor Place Corp., 276 N.L.R.B. 445, 449 (1985).
186. 405 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1968).
187. Id. at 666.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Keller Ladders Southern, Inc., 405 F.2d at 666.
191. Id. at 667.
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leading case is Coamo Knitting Mills, Inc.192 In Coamo, a meeting took place
on company property and, for a few employees, on company time.193 At the
meeting, a manager introduced a union representative who addressed the
employees and distributed authorization cards.194 Another manager was
present for the card distribution and signings but was not in a position to see
which employees, if any, signed cards and which declined.195 The Board,
relying on the manager’s inability to observe which employees signed cards
and on evidence that management made no attempt to find out which
employees attended the meeting, held that there was no section 8(a)(2)
violation.196
The Board’s approach has not been unanimous. In Longchamps, Inc.,197
the Board found no section 8(a)(2) violation when, shortly after hiring its
workforce in anticipation of the opening of its new restaurant, the employer
called an employee meeting to introduce supervisors and explain customer
service and operating policies.198 At the end of the meeting, the restaurant
manager introduced two union representatives, turned the meeting over to
them, and, with the supervisors, left the room.199 The union representatives
solicited the employees to sign authorization cards.200 At another point, the
manager or a supervisor directed four kitchen employees to leave their work
stations and go to the dining room where union representatives met them and
solicited them to sign cards.201 The Board found no section 8(a)(2) violation,
but then Chairman Edward Miller dissented, challenging the fine lines the
Board had drawn between lawful cooperation and illegal coercion:
It is difficult to see much practical difference, so far as the effect on employees
is concerned, between direct supervisory solicitation of authorization cards and
company blessed solicitation by a union organizer on company time and
property of such signatures, especially in an atmosphere where the employer,
by word ordered, indicates that he approves of and supports the efforts of the
organizer and thereafter grants voluntary recognition on the basis of signatures
202
thus obtained.

Section 8(c) of the NLRA provides: “The expressing of any views,
argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed,
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graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor
practice . . . if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise
of benefit.”203
The statutory guarantee of free speech has itself led to some fine line
drawing.204 Whereas an employer directive to sign an authorization card
violates section 8(a)(2),205 in Coamo, the Board found the following speech
lawful because it contained no promise of benefit or threat of reprisal:
There are a number of benefits to us all from the merger—steadier
employment and greater availability of capital for new equipment. There are
also certain obligations. One of these is the requirement that we sign a
contract with the [ILGWU] if you want the Union. Our parent company,
Bobbie Brooks, has had contractual dealings with this Union for twenty-three
years. During this time, it has grown from a few thousand dollars to a
company with sales of seventy-five million—so the Union could not have been
too much of a handicap. Seriously, the ILGWU has shown itself to be a
responsible and intelligent Union, and we anticipate no problems if we deal
with them.
During the next few days, representatives of the Union will be in Coamo to
solicit your membership. Although you are under no compulsion, we urge you
to join. The Company will negotiate a contract with the Union, which we
206
believe will be mutually beneficial.

In essence, the fine line drawing with respect to employer pro-union speech is
no different than the fine line drawing that takes place with respect to employer
anti-union speech. In each case, statements which convey the same substantive
message may fall on one or the other side of the line depending on how they
are worded and the context in which they are uttered.207
2.

Worker Representative Independence

In NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.,208 the employer
had an employee representation plan which, in its most recent form, provided
for an Employee Representative Committee composed entirely of employees
elected by their peers.209 But the plan provided that any amendments to it
could be disapproved by the employer within fifteen days.210 The employer’s
ability to veto changes in the representation plan was sufficient for the Court to
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006).
See, e.g., Tecumseh Corrugated Box Co., 333 N.L.R.B. 1, 7 (2001).
See Dairyland USA Corp., 347 N.L.R.B. 310, 310 (2006).
Coamo, 150 N.L.R.B. at 581, 595.
See generally 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 136–52 (John E. Higgins, Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006).
208. 308 U.S. 241 (1939).
209. Id. at 246–47.
210. Id. at 247.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

548

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:525

declare the plan an illegal employer-dominated labor organization. The Court
reasoned, “The plan may not be amended if the company disapproves the
amendment. Such control of the form and structure of an employe
organization deprives the employes of the complete freedom of action
guaranteed to them by the Act, and justifies an order such as was here
entered.”211
To the Court, the key defect in the plan was the absence of employee
independence due to the employer’s retention of the right to veto changes in
plan structure. That the employer had never exercised its veto power to
interfere with plan structure was immaterial—the power alone was sufficient to
condemn the arrangement.212
The requirement of bargaining representative independence also restricts
the role that supervisors and managers who remain members of the union may
play in the union’s affairs. In its landmark decision in Nassau & Suffolk
County Contractors Association,213 the Board held that for managers who
remain members of the union but are not in a bargaining unit represented by
the union to vote in union elections:
is plainly a form of interference with the administration of a labor
organization. It may not be unlawful for company executives and high-ranking
supervisors to retain the union membership they acquired as rank-and-file
employees as job insurance in the event they should revert to ordinary
employee status, but that does not make it lawful for them to participate in
214
elections to determine who is to administer the affairs of the union.

The Board allowed first line supervisors who were also members of the
bargaining unit to participate in union meetings and elections.215 The Board,
however, held that the employer interfered in the administration of the union,
in violation of section 8(a)(2), by acquiescing in the supervisors’ participation
on the union’s bargaining team.216 The Board reasoned:
Despite the large measure of control exercised over master mechanics by the
Union, the mechanics remain in part agents of their employers with a resulting
divided loyalty and interests . . . . Employees have the right to be represented
in collective-bargaining negotiations by individuals who have a single-minded
loyalty to their interests. Conversely, an employer is under a duty to refrain

211. Id. at 249.
212. Newport News Shipbilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241 at 251 (“In applying the
statutory test of independence it is immaterial that the plan had in fact not engendered, or indeed
had obviated, serious labor disputes in the past, or that any company interference in the
administration of the plan had been incidental rather than fundamental and with good motives.”).
213. 118 N.L.R.B. 174 (1957).
214. Id. at 184.
215. Id. at 186–87.
216. Id. at 187.
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from any action which will interfere with that employee right and place him
217
even in slight degree on both sides of the bargaining table.

The requirement of bargaining representative independence is critical to
the overall scheme of the NLRA. Although some have argued that the NLRA
was a piece of radical legislation which has been undermined by the Board and
the courts,218 when viewed in its historical context, the statute was really quite
conservative. The NLRA came out of the Great Depression and was part of a
broader scheme to more equitably distribute wealth and income, thereby
spurring demand for goods and services and inoculating the economy against
another depression. Thus, section 1 of the NLRA declares, inter alia:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess
full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association
substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate
recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing
219
power of wage earners in industry . . . .

In pursuing the goal of more equitable wage rates and working conditions,
Congress faced a choice. It could have opted for more radical intervention
with the government dictating specific terms and conditions of employment.
Instead, through the NLRA, it took the more conservative approach of
providing workers with a mechanism of self-organization to equalize
bargaining power and then leaving the setting of specific terms of employment
Worker representation
to private negotiation and self-ordering.220
independence of the employer is crucial to the legislative scheme of equalizing
bargaining power and private ordering.221 Professor Kohler has eloquently
explained why:
Absent the economic strength self-association provides individual employees,
the employer typically is free, both de facto and de jure, either to promulgate
and administer the terms governing the employment relationship unilaterally,
or to do so only with such employee participation as it chooses to allow, and
within the limits that it singly establishes. Hence, employee organization into
self-controlled, autonomous groups through the exercise of their basic
associational rights is central to the collective bargaining scheme: it is through
this association that workers are afforded the means to voice and protect their

217. Id.
218. See, e.g., ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE WORKERS’ LAW (2006); Karl E. Klare,
Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness,
1937–1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 265 (1978).
219. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
220. See Thomas C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance of
Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REV. 499, 514 (1986).
221. Id.
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own interests and, thereby, to achieve effective participation in the ordering,
222
i.e., the private lawmaking process.

A number of circuit courts of appeals decisions, however, have shifted the
focus from the employer’s authority to control the labor organization to
whether it has actually exercised that authority to dominate the entity.223 As
then-Board Member Raudabaugh observed in his concurring opinion in
Electromation, Inc.,224 most of these decisions fail to even cite, much less
discuss the precedential authority of Newport News.225
Most troubling is the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Homemaker Shops.226 At
issue was a representation committee comprised of one representative elected
by secret ballot from each of the employer’s stores.227 Representatives served
one-year terms.228 The committee structure and election procedures were
contained in the collective bargaining agreement.229 Consequently, employer
consent was necessary to change them, and the employer twice vetoed
proposed changes in the terms of office and electoral system.230
The employer’s authority over the committee’s structure, terms of office,
and system for electing representatives would seem to place the Homemaker
222. Id. Professor Gely has provided a further reason for the requirement of independence.
Rafael Gely, Whose Team Are You On? My Team or My TEAM?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 323
(1997). He has observed that participation in labor organizations that cooperate with
management requires substantial investment by employees in firm specific human capital. Id. at
376. Cooperative efforts also require investments from the employer. Id. at 377–78. The
employees’ expected return on investment is increased employee voice while the employer’s
expected return on investment is increased productivity and competitiveness. Id. at 378–79.
Professor Gely has suggested that a point can arise where the employer has recouped its
investment and has an incentive to cheat on the implicit contract by eliminating employee voice,
something the employer can do if it controls the labor organization. Id. at 381–82. Ensuring that
the labor organization operates beyond the control of the employer thus protects employees who
would otherwise be vulnerable to such employer strategic behavior. Id. at 391.
223. See, e.g., NLRB v. Homemaker Shops, Inc., 724 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1984); NLRB v.
Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208, 1215 (1st Cir. 1979); Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d
625, 630 (9th Cir. 1974); Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 167–68 (7th Cir.
1955); but see Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1167 (7th Cir. 1994) (relying on
Newport News).
224. 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994). Electromation had the
earmarkings of a major NLRB decision on the legality of employee participation plans under
section 8(a)(2). The Board heard the case en banc and invited and received amicus briefs from all
interested organizations. Id. at 990 n.2. In the end, however, the decision broke no new ground
as the “action committees” at issue in the case turned out to be nothing more than garden variety
employer dominated labor organizations.
225. 309 N.L.R.B. 990, at 1010 n.27 (1998) (Raudabaugh, Member, concurring).
226. Homemaker Shops, Inc., 724 F.2d at 535.
227. Id. at 538.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 539.
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system squarely under the control of Newport News. The Sixth Circuit,
however, would not allow a Supreme Court decision directly on point to deter
it from giving its blessing to a representation plan it liked. Citing a student law
review note for authority, the court characterized Newport News as providing
“a rigid rule . . . [that] runs contrary to more recent trends—the decline of the
notorious ‘company unions,’ the change in public policy from nurturing the
nascent labor movement to regulating and limiting management and labor
excesses alike, and the change in employee attitudes to employer-employee
relations.”231 The court then chose simply to ignore the Supreme Court
precedent.
In his Electromation concurrence, Member Raudabaugh offered an
alternative analysis to undermine the authority of Newport News.232 He opined
that the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act amendments to the NLRA impliedly overruled
Newport News.233 In Member Raudabaugh’s opinion, the Taft-Hartley Act
undermined what he considered the adversarial approach to section 8(a)(2) by
shifting government’s position from promoting collective bargaining to
neutrality, protecting employee choice, and encouraging peaceful resolution of
workplace disputes over adversarial strife.234
Member Raudabaugh’s view misreads the Taft-Hartley amendments. It is
significant that the Taft-Hartley Act did not amend section 8(a)(2). It did
represent a congressional backlash against organized labor premised on the
view that labor had become too powerful.235 Its remedy of adding union unfair
labor practices and an employee right to refrain from concerted activities was
designed not to do away with requirements of representative independence for
participation in privately ordering the workplace, but to rebalance the power of
labor and management to ensure the continued working of that private
ordering.236 Indeed, the deepest recession since the Great Depression has again
raised the question of whether the balance need be adjusted one more time.
Debate over the proposed Employee Free Choice Act has recently focused on
whether the decline in union density has eroded labor standards to the point
where worker purchasing power no longer provides an inoculation against
economic turmoil.237 In any event, it is not surprising that, without attributing

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Homemaker Shops, Inc., 724 F.2d at 547 n.12.
Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 1011–12 (1992).
Id.
Id.
See KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., LABOR LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY
WORKPLACE 66–67 (2009).
236. Id. at 68–69.
237. See Alec MacGillis, Labor Union Bill Raises Broader Capitalism Issues: Economic
Downturn Intensifies Rhetoric of Workers, Business, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2009, at A2.
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it to Member Raudabaugh by name, the Seventh Circuit, in enforcing the
Board’s order in Electromation, rejected his Taft-Hartley Act analysis.238
The current state of the law concerning a requirement that an employee
representative be truly independent of the employer can only be described as
confused. As seen in the next section, how that confusion is resolved affects
the legality of certain provisions of the FFA under American law.
3.

The FFA and Section 8(a)(2)

As characterized by CAW economist Jim Stanford, the FFA represents a
“corporatist type of strategy” to representing workers.239 Under the FFA, the
CAW commits to serving as a check and balance within the Magna human
resources system.240 The FFA clearly takes as a given Magna’s existing
policies which encourage worker identification with their local plants and
management. Because of this, the FFA has been criticized for undermining
worker solidarity. Regardless of the merits of such criticism, the embarkation
on a corporatist approach to representing workers would not per se violate
section 8(a)(2). Section 8(a)(2) mandates only that the labor organization
representing the workers be independent from the employer; it does not
mandate adversarial labor relations. Indeed, inferring a mandate of an
adversarial struggle would be inconsistent with the private ordering that is at
the heart of the NLRA approach to establishing terms and conditions of
employment. Unlike some in-house committees which are financially
dependent on the employer who provides meeting space, supplies, and clerical
support and allows committees to meet on employer time, the CAW has an
independent financial base and its own professional staff and expertise.
In exchange for opting into the Magna corporatist system, the CAW
received some significant advantages that it would not have had if it relied on
established law in organizing. These advantages include access to a list of
employees at a targeted facility, the ability to meet with employees on the
employer’s property for one week during non-working time in non-working
areas, and the joint meeting with management and the employees just prior to
the election at which union and employer representatives present their
commitment to working together toward the facility’s growth and success and
their commitment to the FFA and the national collective bargaining
agreement.241 Cases such as Coamo Knitting Mills establish that these
advantages fall on the cooperation side of the line between cooperation and
coercion.242 Indeed, the granting of access would appear to be an exercise of

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1168–69 (7th Cir. 1994).
See Stanford, supra note 108.
FFA, supra note 1, at 3–4.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
See Coamo, 150 N.L.R.B. 579, 581–82 (1964).
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fundamental employer property rights. Just as an employer has a right to
exclude nonemployee union organizers from its property,243 it has a right to
invite them onto its property. In either case, the right may not be exercised in a
manner that discriminates on the basis of section 7-protected activity, but there
are no reports that other unions or employees opposed to unionization have
sought similar access from Magna.
The content of the joint presentation to the employees at the meeting
conducted on employer time just prior to the election would also appear to be
lawful. As previously discussed, section 8(c) requires drawing a fine line
between lawful, albeit pro-union, employer speech and unlawful coercion.244
The statements as set forth in the FFA would appear to fall on the lawful side
of the line.
One of the most controversial aspects of the FFA is its waiver of the right
to strike and substitution of arbitration to resolve bargaining impasses.
Regardless of one’s views on the desirability of interest arbitration,245 an
agreement to substitute arbitration for economic warfare does not leave the
union at the mercy of the employer. The union retains bargaining leverage,
and CAW economist Stanford argues that it gained increased leverage.246 In
any event, unions enjoy broad discretion in deciding how best to represent
employees in collective bargaining, and a decision to substitute arbitration for
strikes and strike threats certainly falls within that wide range of
reasonableness where courts defer to union decision-making.247
Several aspects of the FFA, however, are problematic under section
8(a)(2). First is the timing of the joint meeting on company time at which
union and employer representatives affirm their commitments to the FFA, the
national agreement, and working together.248 It occurs just prior to the
election.249 In Peerless Plywood Co.,250 the NLRB held that a mass
presentation on company time within twenty-four hours of a representation
election would render the election vulnerable to being invalidated upon the
filing of post-election objections.251 The Board reasoned that “last-minute
speeches by either employers or unions delivered to massed assemblies of

243. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 541 (1992); NLRB v. Babcock and Wilcox
Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113–14 (1956).
244. See supra notes 204–07 and accompanying text.
245. Elsewhere, I have criticized interest arbitration. See Martin H. Malin, Public Employees’
Right to Strike: Law and Experience, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 313, 330–35 (1993).
246. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
247. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 81 (1991); Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 342 (1953).
248. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
250. 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
251. Id. at 429.
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employees on company time have an unwholesome and unsettling effect and
tend to interfere with that sober and thoughtful choice which a free election is
designed to reflect.”252 The Board expressed concern over the last-minute
nature of such speeches coupled with their mass psychology.253 It concluded
that mass addresses on company time within twenty-four hours of an election
“tend to destroy freedom of choice and establish an atmosphere in which a free
election cannot be held.”254
The line between lawful employer cooperation and employer support
violative of section 8(a)(2) turns on whether the conduct at issue interferes
with employee freedom of choice.255 The joint presentation on company time
by union and management representatives just prior to the election poses a
more substantial threat to employee free choice than the single party captive
audience speech within twenty-four hours of the election. When an employer
gives a captive audience speech, it does so in the face of the union’s organized
opposition to its position. Although the union does not have a right to respond
on company time,256 it will still try to reach as many workers as possible to
respond. Where the union and employer make a joint presentation as under the
FFA, there is no organized opposition to respond. Making the joint
presentation just prior to the election precludes employees from discussing and
reflecting on its content and evaluating whether a vote for union recognition is
in their interests. The timing of the joint presentation crosses the line from
lawful cooperation to interference with employee free choice and thus
constitutes unlawful employer support in violation of section 8(a)(2).
A second problematic feature of the FFA is its combining the vote to ratify
the national agreement with the vote for recognition in a single ballot.257 In
effect, this process amounts to a type of conditional recognition condemned in
Majestic Weaving.258 The agreement is negotiated before the vote and, thus,
before any evidence is obtained that the union has been selected by a majority
of the employees. By voting to ratify the agreement, the employees are voting
to be represented by the union. In effect, the employer has recognized the
union and agreed to terms conditioned on the employees’ favorable vote.
One might argue that the FFA is analogous to after-acquired-facilities
clauses which the Board has long upheld. Such an analogy would be flawed.
Like the terms of the collective bargaining agreements applied to new facilities
under after-acquired-facilities clauses, the terms of the CAW-Magna national

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 430.
Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1974).
See Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 408–09 (1953).
FFA supra note 1, at 5.
See supra note 175–78 and accompanying text.
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agreement appear to have been negotiated at arm’s length. The CAW already
represented employees at three Magna facilities when the terms were
negotiated. Yet, the contract covering employees at newly organized facilities
is different from the contract covering the facilities that had already been
organized. It was negotiated specifically for the facilities that would be
organized in the future. Its taking effect anywhere was conditioned on the
employees somewhere voting for CAW representation.259 The FFA is much
more like conditional recognition than after-acquired facilities provisions.
The actual election at Windsor Modules demonstrates how such
conditional recognition can interfere with employee free choice. The contract
granted production workers an immediate $3.00 per hour raise, retroactive to
two months earlier, with further raises of $0.50 at six months and one year of
service.260 It granted skilled trades employees a retroactive payment of $1000
and raises of $0.50 per hour at six months of service and one year of service.261
The CAW leadership’s PowerPoint presentation to the CAW Council
acknowledged the impact of this conditional recognition on the results at
Windsor Modules:
Everyone got an immediate $3 per hour wage increase. Future wage increases
are also specified. Plus there will be an automatic annual adjustment based on
the trend in consumer prices. That’s something we don’t have at many existing
CAW bargaining units. . . . Additional wage increases will also be paid based
on plant-level performance.
Those increases are built right into the base wage rate—not paid out as onetime bonuses, as is currently the practice. . . These are important economic
gains. Incremental progress. Progress that will improve the lives of our new
262
members. No wonder they voted 87% for the union.

It has long been established, however, that a grant of benefits for the
purpose of influencing employees’ exercise of the right to self-organization is
coercive and illegal.263 Combining contract ratification and recognition in the
same vote has the same effect, and in the United States, would constitute
illegal employer support of a labor organization in violation of section
8(a)(2).264
259. See supra Part I.
260. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE CAW/MAGNA WINDSOR MODULES AGREEMENT (Nov. 7, 2007),
available at http://www.caw.ca/assets/pdf/highlightsWindsorModules.pdf.
261. Id.
262. CAW FFA PowerPoint, supra note 10, at 26.
263. See NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964).
264. Another aspect of the vote may also be problematic under § 8(a)(2). The FFA provides
for recognition if a majority of those voting in a private election ratify the national collective
bargaining agreement. In Komatz Construction, a private election was held in which a rival union
sought to oust an incumbent exclusive bargaining representative. The court held that the rival’s
getting the votes of a majority of the voters, but not a majority of the bargaining unit, did not
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Finally, we must consider the effect of the FFA on the CAW’s
independence. We have already seen that the provision for appointment of the
EAs, would, if applied in the United States, violate the requirement of Title IV
of the LMRDA that local union members elect their officers by direct secret
ballot vote.265 The LMRDA’s mandate of local union democracy helps ensure
that the union will operate independently of the employer in representing the
workers. Yet, if the CAW wanted to correct the method of selecting the EAs
to comply with the LMRDA, it could not do so without Magna’s consent.
The FFA provides:
The parties agree that the fundamental principles set out in this FFA and any
supplemental agreements, letters or memoranda (the “Supplements”), shall not
be changed through future negotiation, arbitration nor shall such principles be
the basis for any labour action. Any changes to the FFA or the Supplements
266
shall only be made through mutual agreement between the parties.

The FFA specifies that all Magna facilities at which the CAW is
recognized form a single amalgamated CAW local.267 It also specifies how the

allow the employer to voluntarily recognize the rival union. See generally Komatz Constr., Inc.
v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1972). In Autodie Int’l Inc., UAW Local 2304 was the
incumbent exclusive representative of the employees of Autodie Corporation when Autodie
Corporation filed for reorganization in bankruptcy. In the reorganization proceeding, Autodie
International Corporation purchased the assets of Autodie Corporation and began negotiations
with Local 2304. Two hundred of the employer’s 348 employees, however, signed a petition
stating that they desired that the negotiations proceed with an in-house committee rather than
Local 2304 and the employer withdrew recognition from Local 2304. The employer also advised
the employees that an in-house committee would be recognized. Thereafter, an election was held
to elect three shop committeemen for the Autodie International In-House Shop Committee. Of
the 309 employees in the bargaining unit, 139 voted. The top three vote getters received
respectively seventy-two, thirty-two and thirty votes. Thirty-one ballots were invalidated because
they sought representation by Local 2304 or voted for Local 2304 leaders who declined do be
nominated for the shop committee. The employer recognized the In-House Shop Committee and
began bargaining with the three top vote getters. The Board affirmed the Administrative Law
Judge’s recommended decision, which found that the employer violated section 8(a)(2) by
recognizing the shop committee. The ALJ concluded that the vote did not establish that a
majority of the employees in the bargaining unit desired representation by the shop committee.
See Autodie Int’l. Inc.v. Int’l. Union, 321 N.L.R.B. 688–91 (1996). An Advice Memorandum
issued by the NLRB General Counsel on January 4, 2005, reads Komatz and Autodie for the
proposition that an employer violates § 8(a)(2) if it voluntarily recognizes a union which, in a
private election, receives the votes of a majority of the voters but not a majority of the bargaining
unit. Whittier Hosp. Med. Ctr. No. 21-CA-36404 (NLRB GC Div of Advice, Jan. 4, 2005). If
the Board were to concur with the advice memorandum, the FFA provision for recognition upon
receipt of a vote of the majority of voters rather than a majority of employees in the bargaining
unit would be considered illegal.
265. See supra notes 151–61 and accompanying text.
266. FFA, supra note 1, at 13.
267. Id. at 6.
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officers of the local will be selected and how the EAs who represent the
bargaining unit members at the facility level will be selected, including
required qualifications.268 None of these significant matters of internal union
governance may be changed without agreement from Magna.269
Such employer control over a union’s internal operations would appear to
fall squarely within section 8(a)(2)’s prohibition on employer interference with
the administration of a labor organization.270 It also falls squarely within the
holding of Newport News that a union whose changes to internal structure may
be vetoed by an employer is an employer-dominated labor organization.271
As developed earlier, however, a few circuit courts of appeals have
disregarded the precedent established in Newport News. These courts require a
showing of actual domination by the employer to sustain a finding of a section
8(a)(2) violation. Mere possession of the power to dominate is insufficient.272
Under these courts’ analyses, the Magna power to veto changes in the internal
administration of the amalgamated local would probably be held lawful. It is
highly unlikely that a court would find actual domination of the CAW, the
largest private sector union in Canada.
The FFA, however, illustrates why the courts that have ignored Newport
News are mistaken. In defending the local union structure and method of
selecting the EAs, CAW leadership has acknowledged that the “indirect
election” is uncommon but has urged that it is not unprecedented in Canada.273
CAW leadership maintains that the EAs will be strong union advocates and
points out that the national CAW staff will also service the Magna bargaining
units.274 CAW leadership, however, has never defended Magna’s retention of
the power to veto changes to the union’s internal structure and processes; nor
could it. No party has ever suggested any legitimate business purpose served
by Magna’s retention of such power. An agreement which empowers an
employer to intrude on the autonomy of the exclusive bargaining
representative by having a say in its internal structure and process for selecting
its leaders should be supported by a very strong legitimate business purpose for
it to be lawful.275

268. Id.
269. Id. at 8.
270. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2006).
271. NLRB v. Newport News, 308 U.S. 241, 250–51 (1939).
272. See supra notes 223–31 and accompanying text.
273. CAW FFA PowerPoint, supra note 10, at 19.
274. Id. at 16.
275. Some have argued that the requirement of labor organization independence from the
employer is anachronistic in light of fundamentally changed global economic circumstances. See,
e.g., Michael H. LeRoy, Employee Participation in the New Millennium: Redefining a Labor
Organization under Section (8)(a)(2) of the NLRA, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1651, 1653–56 (1999).
Such arguments have come close to but not succeeded in changing the law. In 1997, Congress
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To recap, the combined vision of Title IV of the LMRDA and section
8(a)(2) of the NLRA is one of employees represented by an autonomous labor
organization that is independent of employer control, that they have freely
chosen as their representative and that they control through direct democratic
elections. Against this standard, the FFA fails to measure up. Consequently,
were it implemented in the United States, it should be declared unlawful.
III. LESSONS FROM THE FFA EXERCISE
Although there are no reports of FFA-like agreements adopted in the
United States, the use of neutrality and voluntary recognition agreements has
become the most favored method of organizing by American unions.276 With
increased use has come increased resistance. Conservative Republicans in
Congress have introduced legislation that would ban voluntary recognition.277
In 2007, the National Labor Relations Board, populated by appointees of
President Bush, overruled more than forty years of precedent that held a
voluntary recognition would not bar a petition to decertify the newlyrecognized union nor would a contract negotiated by the union bar a
representation petition unless the parties first posted a notice advising
employees that they have forty-five days to file a decertification petition with
the NLRB.278
Neutrality and voluntary recognition agreements in the United States do
not implicate Title IV of the LMRDA. The analysis of the FFA under section
8(a)(2) of the NLRA, however, can provide useful insight into the legality of
neutrality and voluntary recognition agreements used in the United States. As
demonstrated above, the primary concerns of section 8(a)(2) are ensuring
bargaining representative independence from the employer and employee free
choice.279 Under this standard, most features of neutrality and voluntary
recognition agreements are clearly lawful. As discussed in the context of the

passed the Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1997 (TEAM ACT), which would
have amended section 8(a)(2) to allow employers to “establish, assist, maintain, or participate” in
organizations “in which employees participate . . . to address matters” of mutual interest which do
not “have, claim, or seek authority to negotiate or enter into collective bargaining agreements.”
H.R. 743, 104th Cong. (1997); S. 295, 105th Cong. (1997). President Clinton vetoed the TEAM
Act and Congress failed to override his veto. Even the TEAM Act would have continued the
requirement of independence for a labor organization that sought to negotiate collective
bargaining agreements.
276. See James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects
for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 847 (2005).
277. Secret Ballot Protection Act, H.R. 4343, 110th Cong. (2004); Secret Ballot Protection
Act, S. 2637, 108th Cong. (2004).
278. Dana Corp. & Metaldyne Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 434–35 (2007). The election of
President Obama probably means an end to the Board’s assault on voluntary recognition.
279. See supra Part II.B.
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FFA, employers are free to exercise their property rights by granting unions
access to employees on the premises as long as they do not discriminate in
doing so.280 Their free speech rights under section 8(c) allow them to make
presentations favorable to a union as long as they do not cross the line into
active coercion.281 And if employers have free speech rights to speak
favorably about unions, they certainly have free speech rights to remain silent
(i.e. to maintain a stance of neutrality).
An issue pending before the Board is the legality of an agreement
establishing a framework for collective bargaining in the event of voluntary
recognition.282 The issue arises out of unfair labor practice charges filed
against Dana Corporation.283 The UAW’s agreement with Dana provided for
employer neutrality and union access to nonworking areas of the plant.284 It
provided that in no event would bargaining erode healthcare “solutions and
concepts” that were scheduled to be implemented on January 1, 2004,
including premium sharing, deductibles, and out of pocket maximums.285 It
also committed that any collective bargaining agreement would be of at least
four years in duration and that the parties would resort to interest arbitration if
they could not reach an agreement.286
The agreement also specified subjects that must be included in any
contract, including: flexible compensation, minimum classifications, teambased approaches, and mandatory overtime.287 The agreement divided the
Dana facilities into three levels, and further divided level 1 facilities, such as
those which manufactured products for General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler,
into two phases.288 The UAW agreed that it would initially only organize level
1, phase 1 facilities and would not organize more than seven at one time.289
The agreement created a “national partnership steering committee,” with an
equal number of members from the union and the company.290 The UAW
agreed that it would not organize beyond level 1, phase 1 facilities unless a
majority of the steering committee agreed that the overall impact of the
collective bargaining agreements had not “materially harmed . . . financial

280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 202–07 and accompanying text.
Dana Corp., 7-CA-46965 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Apr. 11, 2005).
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Dana Corp., 7-CA-46965 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Apr. 11, 2005).
Id. at 5 n.5.
Id. at 5.
Id.
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performance.”291 If the committee deadlocked, the dispute was to be submitted
for third party resolution.292
After a hearing, an NLRB administrative law judge dismissed the section
8(a)(1) and (2) charges that had been filed against Dana and section 8(b)(1)(A)
charges that had been filed against the UAW.293 He ruled that the NLRB
General Counsel’s theory that the framework agreement amounted to unlawful
recognition of the UAW by Dana at a time when the UAW did not have
majority support was not properly pled in the complaint.294 The administrative
law judge also considered the merits of the complaint as an alternative basis for
dismissal. He concluded that Dana had not recognized the UAW, either
expressly or by implication:
There is no evidence that Dana deals with the UAW concerning employee
grievances. Importantly, Dana remains free to make changes in terms and
conditions of employees without first notifying and on request bargaining with
the UAW. This is utterly at odds with the notion that Dana has recognized the
UAW. There is no concept of partial recognition in labor law; there is either
recognition or there is not. Nor can it be said that the letter of agreement
constitutes a collective bargaining agreement from which recognition can be
inferred. The letter of agreement does not deal with significant matters such as
295
wages, pensions, grievances and arbitration, vacations, union security, etc.

The administrative law judge distinguished Majestic Weaving on the
grounds that Majestic Weaving involved conditional recognition, whereas the
Dana case did not involve recognition at all. In addition, the contract
negotiated in Majestic Weaving was more complete than the framework
agreement in Dana.296 Review of the administrative law judge’s decision is
pending before the Board.
Analysis of the FFA revealed two primary concerns that underlie section
8(a)(2): employee free choice and labor organization independence.297 This
same framework can be used to analyze the UAW-Dana and similar
framework agreements.
The administrative law judge’s analysis of the framework agreement is
appropriate but insufficient. The administrative law judge’s focus on the
framework agreement’s vagueness and failure to address most significant
subjects of bargaining recognizes that the framework agreement cannot be
characterized as a fait accompli of recognition that would overcome
291. Id.
292. Dana Corp., 7-CA-46965 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Apr. 11, 2005).
293. Id. at 7–10.
294. Id. at 6–7.
295. Id. at 7–8.
296. Id. at 8.
297. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the objective of employee freedom of choice); supra
Part II.B.2 (discussing the objective of worker representative independence).
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employees’ free choice in deciding whether to sign cards authorizing the UAW
to serve as their exclusive bargaining representative. Other aspects of the
framework agreement, however, also bear on whether it undermines employee
free choice. Significantly, unlike the CAW-Magna Windsor Modules
agreement, the UAW-Dana framework agreement does not promise any
improvement in wages or benefits to employees for opting for UAW
representation. It does commit to concepts such as premium sharing,
deductibles, and out-of-pocket maximums that have become so common in
health insurance that one would expect to find them in any newly organized
It also commits vaguely to flexible
bargaining unit’s contract.298
compensation, team-based approaches, minimum classifications, and
mandatory overtime.299 None of these commitments can be said to be
promises of benefits. Here too, the framework agreement does not seem to
undermine employee freedom of choice.
When the agreement was reached, Dana issued a press release announcing
it, but the parties agreed to keep the terms confidential, so the terms were not
disclosed.300 The General Counsel argued that the confidentiality agreement
communicated to employees that the UAW had a special insider relationship
with Dana and implied that Dana had already recognized the union.301 The
administrative law judge rejected this contention as outside the scope of the
complaint.302 The administrative law judge further opined:
Dana and the UAW publicly announced the existence of the letter of
agreement even if they did not reveal its precise terms. By now all employees
who are interested will know of the specific terms of the letter of agreement.
Employees are free [to] make what they will of the letter of agreement in
303
deciding whether or not to support union representation.

Availability of information concerning the existence of the agreement and
its general terms is important to employees in order to protect employee free
choice. In the agreement, the UAW committed to what CAW economist Jim
Stanford called a corporatist type approach to collective representation.304
Knowledge of that commitment would be very relevant to an employee’s
decision to opt for or oppose UAW representation. Employees might prefer
representation by a labor organization that takes a more traditional adversarial

298. Dana Corp., 7-CA-46965 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Apr. 11, 2005).
299. Id. at 5–6.
300. Press Release, Dana Corporation, Dana Corporation Announces Settlements with USW
and UAW Agreement with Centerbridge Capital Partners on Major Investment in Dana (July 6,
2005), available at http://dana.mediaroom.com/index.php/press_releases/2118?printable.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 7.
303. Id.
304. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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approach, or they might simply feel that a corporatist representation approach
does not add sufficient value to justify union dues and other costs.
Transparency in such private deals is necessary to preserve employee free
choice.
Apart from its impact on employee free choice, the agreement must be
evaluated for its impact on bargaining representative independence. Unlike the
FFA, the UAW-Dana agreement gives Dana no say in the internal structure of
the locals representing Dana employees or in how they select their
leadership.305 The agreement commits the UAW to a cooperative, corporatist
approach to collective bargaining, but within that general framework, leaves
considerable room for negotiation of specific terms. If the employees freely
opt for a cooperative, corporatist approach to representation, the UAW’s
commitment to such an approach would not seem to restrict its independence
to the point where the agreement could be characterized as employer
interference in the administration of a labor organization. Here too, the key to
legality is transparency.
One aspect of the UAW-Dana agreement that the administrative law judge
did not rule on was the restrictions it placed on the UAW’s organizing.306
Such restrictions do not raise issues of employee free choice as employees
have no right to compel an unwilling union to serve as their exclusive
representative. They do, however, raise questions of bargaining representative
independence.
The UAW-Dana agreement applies only to Dana facilities that supply the
“Detroit Three,” facilities labeled level 1.307 It does not appear that the
agreement bars the UAW from organizing other Dana facilities. It merely
means that such organizing would occur without the access and neutrality
advantages provided for in the agreement. With respect to level 1 facilities, the
agreement precludes the UAW from organizing those categorized as phase 2
facilities unless a joint labor-management committee determines that the
overall impact of collective bargaining has not harmed the company’s financial
performance.308 If the committee deadlocks, the issue is submitted to a neutral
third party for resolution.309 As a practical matter, because the union appoints
half of the committee members, the union has the power to deadlock the
committee and force the issue to third party resolution. Thus, restraints on the
union’s organizing phase 2 facilities are ultimately determined by the third
party neutral, not by Dana. In other words, Dana does not have the power to

305. Compare FFA supra note 1, compare with UAW-Dana Agreement supra Press Release
note 301.
306. Dana Corp., 7-CA-46965 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Apr. 11, 2005).
307. Id. at 5 n.3.
308. Id. at 5.
309. Id.
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veto the UAW’s organizing activity. Under these circumstances, it would not
appear that this aspect of the agreement so restricts the union’s independence
as to render it an unlawful interference in the administration of a labor
organization.310
CONCLUSION
The landmark Framework of Fairness Agreement between the CAW and
Magna International represents the CAW’s response to declining union density
in the Canadian private sector. The agreement, however, has generated
considerable controversy in Canada because of its substitution of interest
arbitration for the right to strike and doing away with traditional trappings of
union representation such as traditional grievance procedures and directly
elected show stewards and local officers. In the United States, Title IV of the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act and section 8(a)(2) of the
National Labor Relations Act together envision employees represented by
labor organizations they have freely chosen, that are independent of their
employers and that they control through direct democratic processes. Were the
FFA adopted in the United States, it would not measure up to these standards
and would likely be found to violate both statutes.
Unions in the United States have come to rely increasingly on private
agreements providing for employer neutrality, union access to employees on
employer property, and voluntary recognition when organizing employees.
Such agreements have been controversial both with respect to the premise that
parties can contract out of NLRB representation procedures and with respect to
what unions have agreed to in return for these organizing advantages.
Although such agreements are unlikely to implicate the LMRDA, they have
been challenged under section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA. The evaluation of the
FFA from the standpoint of effect on employee free choice and effect on labor
organization independence provides a useful vehicle for analyzing the legality
of these private agreements.

310. The Dana-UAW agreement is in marked contrast to other agreements reported in the
media. For example, it has been reported that the Service Employees International Union has
entered into secret agreements with certain employers whereby, in exchange for employer
neutrality and card check recognition at some locations, SEIU has promised not to organize
employees at other locations. It has been alleged that SEIU abandoned an organizing drive
among security guards employed by Allied Barton Security Services at Temple University and
the University of Pennsylvania in exchange for the company’s agreement to neutrality and card
check in Boston, Los Angeles, Washington and Seattle. See Jane M. Von Bergen, For Union,
Pragmatism vs. Principle: SEIU is Active in 1 Recruiting Drive in Phila., but Abandoned
Another, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 27, 2008, at B1. Such secret deals that enable an
employer to, in effect, veto where a union will organize, do raise substantial issues about labor
organization independence and are of questionable legality.
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